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INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to Respondent's assertion, Petitioners have not 
asked this Court to create an exception to the jurisdictional 
requirement for finality. Rather, Petitioners ask this Court to 
interpret the term "final" in a manner that is fair as well as 
consistent with case law and governing statutes. Like federal 
courts, this Court can adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine as a 
practical construction of the finality requirement in order to 
adjudicate claims that finally determine an important issue, 
separate from the merits of the case and that are effectively 
unreviewable on appeal. Unlike parties to a trial, who can seek 
a discretionary appeal for such claims under Rule 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, parties to this administrative 
hearing have no avenue for seeking a discretionary appeal. As a 
result, Petitioners will forever lose the opportunity to preserve 
their statutory and constitutional rights unless this Court 
reviews the substantive claims in the Petition for Review. 
Despite this Court's Order for plenary presentation of the 
case and full briefing of the issues involved therein, Respondent 
has merely briefed the jurisdictional issue raised by the Court's 
Motion for Summary Disposition. Petitioners, therefore, request 
this Court to vacate the Order Converting the Citations to a 
Formal Adjudicative Proceeding once the Court resolves the 
jurisdictional issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE AS AN 
EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FINALITY REQUIREMENT. 
A. Applying the Collateral Order Doctrine is a Matter of 
Statutory Construction. 
Respondent correctly asserts that this Court's jurisdiction 
arises from Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2) and 63-46b-16(1), which 
only permit review of "final" agency orders. However, Respondent 
incorrectly concludes that this Court has no authority to 
interpret the term "final." It is axiomatic that a court has 
authority to interpret the statute which defines its own 
jurisdiction and Petitioners merely ask this Court to do so here. 
Contrary to Respondent's assertions otherwise, the 
Collateral Order Doctrine is nothing more than an interpretation 
of the statutory term "final." Adopting the Collateral Order 
Doctrine is therefore well within the purview of this Court. For 
almost fifty years, federal courts have applied the Doctrine as a 
"practical rather than a technical construction" of the finality 
requirement. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (1949). The Cohen Court recognized that 
a rigid, inflexible definition deprives a party the opportunity 
to adjudicate claims that are "too important to be denied review 
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. Therefore, a decision that conclusively 
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resolves an important issue which is completely separate from the 
merits of the underlying action and which is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal is considered final for purposes of 
federal appellate review. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
742, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982). 
Utah courts should adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine 
because they have consistently interpreted the finality 
requirement to mean the same thing as federal courts. In Cohen, 
the United States Supreme Court recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
permitted appeals only from "final decisions of the district 
courts." Cohen. 337 U.S. at 546. As a matter of statutory 
interpretation, the Court construed the "final decision" 
requirement to preclude appellate review "[s]o long as the matter 
remains open, unfinished or inconclusive." Id. Utah appellate 
courts have similarly interpreted the use of "final" under the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). In Sloan v. Board 
of Review. 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court 
determined that "an order of [an] administrative agency is not 
final so long as it reserves something for the agency for further 
decision." Id. at 464; see also Barney v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). Since the United States Supreme Court crafted 
the Collateral Order Doctrine under a definition of "final" 
virtually identical to that articulated in Sloan and Barney. this 
155364 3 
Court's adoption of the Doctrine would be entirely consistent 
with Utah precedents as a practical and fair construction of that 
term. 
Respondent argues that this Court is constrained to apply a 
rigid, technical interpretation to UAPA's finality requirement. 
Petitioners, on the other hand, offer a practical and fair 
construction, which federal courts have long used to resolve 
important issues that would otherwise be unreviewable on appeal. 
Unless this Court adopts the Collateral Order Doctrine, 
Petitioners will be forced to adjudicate their citations in the 
wrong forum and the Division will be permitted to violate its own 
rules unchecked. Most importantly, once Petitioners are forced 
through the unlawful procedure, they will have suffered the harm 
they now seek to avoid. Accordingly, Petitioners ask the Court 
to take this opportunity to adopt a fair and practical 
construction of the finality requirement and to consider 
favorably the Petition for Review. 
B. Justice Requires Application of the Doctrine in the 
Absence of any Alternative Route for Review. 
Administrative agency proceedings require application of the 
Collateral Order Doctrine because, unlike trial proceedings, 
parties cannot petition for discretionary appellate review of 
155364 4 
i ssues a f fec t ing important r i g h t s . See Utah R. App. P. 5 & 18.x 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures permits p a r t i e s 
the "opportunity to convince an appe l la te court tha t the issue 
ra i sed i s so important tha t review p r io r to fu l l adjudicat ion of 
the case i s j u s t i f i e d or tha t the order wi l l escape review 
a l toge ther if an appeal i s not allowed." Tyler v. Department of 
Human Services , 874 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1994). Yet, Rule 18 
deprives Pe t i t i one r s of tha t opportunity in t h e i r adminis t ra t ive 
proceeding. The absence of any chance for review begs for a 
p r a c t i c a l construct ion of the f i n a l i t y requirement and for 
app l ica t ion of the Col la te ra l Order Doctrine. 
Utah appe l l a te courts have not yet had an opportunity to 
apply the Col la te ra l Order Doctrine in a case where p e t i t i o n e r s 
have no access to a d i sc re t ionary appeal . In Tyler v . Department 
of Human Services . 874 P.2d 119 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme 
These rules read in pertinent part as follows: 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be sought by any party by f i l ing 
a pet i t ion for permission to appeal from the 
interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate 
court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days 
after the entry of the order of the tr ia l court, with 
proof of service on a l l other parties to the action. . 
Rule 18. Applicability of other rules to review. 
All provisions of these rules are applicable to review 
of decisions or orders of agencies, except that Rules 3 
through 8 are not applicable. . . . 
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Court declined adopting the Col la te ra l Order Doctrine in order to 
review a d i s t r i c t court discovery order.2 The Court considered 
the Doctrine, but u l t imate ly re jec ted appl ica t ion in tha t case 
because the "defendants had an avenue to appeal [the] 
in te r locu tory order under ru le 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which they chose not to pursue." Id. a t 120. 
In contras t to Tyler, absent the Col la te ra l Order Doctrine, 
Pe t i t i one r s in t h i s case have no opportunity to convince a court 
tha t important i s sues , which are unreviewable l a t e r , should be 
addressed. Essen t i a l ly , Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure deprives Pe t i t i one r s of t h i s opportunity, which the 
Col la te ra l Order Doctrine i s intended to provide. I t i s pa ten t ly 
unfai r to afford p a r t i e s in t r i a l proceedings a chance to seek 
review of decis ions tha t i r reparably harm t h e i r r i g h t s , while 
precluding the same opportunity for p a r t i e s to an adminis t ra t ive 
proceedings. 
Pe t i t i one r s seek an opportunity to convince t h i s Court that 
the Division has v io la ted i t s own ru les by placing them in a 
2
 Not only did the State argue for adoption of the Collateral Order 
Doctrine in Tvler, see Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Disposition in Tvler v. Department of Human Services at Addendum A, but the Court 
in Tvler noted that "the s t a t e has urged t h i s court to adopt the federal 
co l l a t e r a l order doctrine in several other cases f i l ed t h i s term." Tvler 874 
P. 2d a t 119. Respondent's contention that the Pet i t ion for Review i s 
"fr ivolous," therefore, i s without merit in l igh t of the Attorney General 's 
attempts in previous cases to obtain appellate review of orders on the same basis 
as Pe t i t ioners in t h i s case, namely by way of the Col la teral Order Doctrine. 
Indeed, Respondent a sse r t s in i t s brief that the Collateral Order Doctrine s t i l l 
has a place in Utah jurisprudence. See Brief of Respondents at 10 n .2 . 
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procedural track that deprives them of important statutory and 
constitution rights. Without appellate review at this stage of 
the proceedings, their ability to do so will be forever lost. In 
the interest of fairness, Petitioners respectfully request this 
Court to adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine. 
II. THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THIS COURT 
BECAUSE IT ARISES OUT OF A FORMAL ADJUDICATION. 
Respondent mischaracterizes the subject matter of the 
Petition for Review as arising from an informal adjudication. 
The Division converted the proceedings to a formal adjudication 
and now denies that disputes between the parties arise from a 
formal proceeding. Respondent cannot have it both ways. 
Petitioners seek review of two orders: (i) the Order 
Converting the Citations to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings, 
dated April 8, 1994, and (ii) the Department of Commerce Order on 
Review, dated June 27, 1994, by which the Department refused to 
consider Petitioners' request that it vacate the Conversion 
Order. See Petitioners' Brief at n.l. The latter order arises 
out of Petitioners' efforts to seek reversal of the Conversion 
Order after conversion occurred. Although the arguments in the 
Petitioners' brief center on the Conversion Order, the Petition 
for Review technically arises from the Department's Order on 
Review. Clearly, the Department issued its Order after the 
citation proceedings had been converted to a formal adjudication 
155364 7 
and this Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the 
Department incorrectly refused to vacate the Conversion Order. 
Even if the Conversion Order was the only matter before this 
Court, the Court would still have jurisdiction because, as of the 
time the Conversion Order came into existence, these proceedings 
became formal. Respondent points to no other point in time when 
the informal proceedings ceased and the formal ones began. 
Surely, Respondent is not purporting that the proceedings have 
not yet become formal. In fact, prior to this Petition for 
Review, the parties had scheduled and begun discovery under the 
statutes governing formal proceedings. The formal adjudication 
came into existence the instant the Conversion Order did, and 
this Court, consequently, has jurisdiction to review that Order. 
III. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THIS CASE ARISES FROM AN 
INFORMAL ADJUDICATION, TRANSFER TO DISTRICT COURT IS PROPER. 
If the Court decides that the Petition for Review arises 
from an informal adjudication, and, that petition to the Court of 
Appeals is improper, the correct disposition of the case is 
transfer, not dismissal. Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides that if a petition for review is filed in a 
court without jurisdiction "the appellate court . . . shall 
transfer the case . . . to the court with appellate jurisdiction 
in the case." Accordingly, since Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 
grants the district court appellate jurisdiction over final 
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orders from informal administrative proceedings, transfer to the 
district court would be proper upon a finding that the Conversion 
Order arose from an informal adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the Petition for 
Review because the contested Orders arose out of a formal 
proceeding. Moreover, this Court has authority to adopt the 
Collateral Order Doctrine as a practical and fair construction of 
the finality requirement for jurisdiction. Indeed, the peculiar 
scheme that prohibits parties from seeking discretionary appeals 
of interlocutory administrative orders begs for the application 
of the Doctrine as a matter of fairness. Petitioners, therefore, 
respectfully request this Court to: (i) adopt the Collateral 
Order Doctrine, (ii) address the substantive issues contained in 
Petitioners' Brief, and (iii) vacate the Conversion Order. 
DATED this ^ -LK day of March, 1995. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
James B. Lee 
Barbara K. Polich 
William J. Stilling 
Of and For 
PARSONS BEHLE AND LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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I hereby certify that on this ^7 day of March, 1995, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners' Reply Brief, to: 
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CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAN L. TYLER, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, NORMAN G. 
ANGUS, and CHARLES F. 
LARSEN, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Subject to Assignment to the 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 930428 
Defendants/Appellants, the State of Utah, Utah 
Department of Human Services, Norman G. Angus and Charles F. 
Larsen, submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to Rule 10(c) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has alleged this court lacks jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal as there is no final order. Defendants concede 
there is no order of determination of final judgment in this 
case; nor should there be. This case is before the appellate 
court based on a direct appeal as of right in accordance with the 
collateral order doctrine, a recognized exception to the finality 
rule. 
Utah courts have never addressed the issue of whether 
the collateral order doctrine forms a basis for an appeal as of 
right of a non-final order. Defendants argue the court should 
extend existing law, apply the collateral order doctrine to the 
facts of this case, and grant defendants a right to appeal the 
trial court's order in this case. (The Order is attached as 
Exhibit A; the Defendant's Docketing Statement is attached as 
Exhibit B.) 
For over forty years, courts have recognized a party's 
right to appeal an interlocutory order of a lower court under the 
collateral order doctrine described in Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indust. Loan Corp.. 337 U.S. 541, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 
(1941). For Cohen's collateral order doctrine to apply, the 
lower court's order must: (1) "conclusively determine the 
disputed question;" (2) "resolve an important issue completely 
separate from the merits of the action;" and (3) "be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand 
v. Livesay. 437 U.S. 463, 468, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351, 98 S. Ct. 2454 
(1988).l 
*In 15A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper. Federal Practice and 
Procedure 3911 at 347 (1992), the commentator's note that the 
"Supreme Court's decisions establish the general contours of 
collateral order doctrine, even as they permit one element or 
another to be subordinated." They point out that the three-part 
test in Coopers & Lybrand "is no more than a useful starting point 
for analysis," id. at 351 and that "'as with so many multi-pronged 
legal tests it manages to be at once redundant, incomplete and 
unclear,'" id. (quoting Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 
1318 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 95 L. Ed. 2d 
836, 107 S. Ct. 2180 (1987)). 
A lower court's order is deemed to have conclusively 
determined the disputed question if the order is "made with the 
expectation that it will be the final word on the subject 
addressed." Gulf Stream Aerospace v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 
271, 277, 99 L. Ed. 2d 296, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988). The trial 
court's order of July 16, 1993 represents the final word on 
defendant's obligation to provide exhaustive answers to discovery 
requests despite conflicting language in the Government Records 
Access and Management Act (GRAMA) and in Rule 26, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The trial court's order also resolves an important 
issue completely separate from the merits of the action. The 
collateral order doctrine requires that the issue be important in 
a jurisprudential sense. Nemours Foundation v. Manganaro Corp., 
New England, 878 F.2d 98, 100 (3rd Cir. 1989). See also Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731, 742, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 102 S. Ct. 2690 
(1987) (collateral appeal of interlocutory order must present a 
serious and unsettled question). Given the confusion created by 
GRAMA with regard to the production of documents in discovery/ an 
issue which affects a large number of parties and non-parties, 
and given the numbers of cases which involve the same facts and 
problems, this court should review the conflicting methodology 
and resolve the issue. Thus, the question is important in a 
jurisprudential sense. 
Moreover, the issue of production of discovery is 
separate from the merits as it is not "enmeshed in the factual 
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and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action." 
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469. In examining the propriety 
of the trial court's order, this court need not reach the 
underlying factual and legal issues regarding plaintiff's 
Whistle-blower action, her claim for breach of contract, or her 
allegation of sex discrimination. 
Finally, the trial court's order is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal. If this court were to wait to resolve 
this issue on direct appeal after a determination on the merits, 
as plaintiff would have it, and if the court were then to 
determine that the trial court improperly applied GRAMA and Rule 
26 to compel discovery, the defendants would have permanently 
lost the opportunity to resolve the collateral discovery issues 
administratively without simultaneously defending this litigation 
in the trial court. Cf. Mitchell v. Forsvth. 472 U.S. 511, 526-
27, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985). Thus, the 
defendants have asserted a right which would be destroyed if not 
vindicated before trial on the merits. United States v. 
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 56 L. Ed. 2d 18, 98 S. Ct. 1547 
(1978). 
While it has been argued that exceptions to the final 
judgment rule are unwarranted and "rise like Athena from the head 
of Zeus," United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir. 
1986), practical application of the doctrine is consistently 
encouraged. 
In our view, the Cohen court asserted the 
need for the practical application of [the 
4 
collateral order doctrine] particularly in 
situations where it is clearly urgent that an 
important issue . . • be decided. Thus, in 
the unique instance where the issue is not 
'collateral' but justice may require 
immediate review, a balancing approach should 
be followed to make this jurisdictional 
decision. The circumstances of the instant 
case require the application of such a 
balancing test rather than the mechanical 
analysis of the collateral order exception. 
The critical inquiry is whether the danger of 
injustice by delaying appellate review out-
weighs the Inconvenience and costs of piece-
meal review. 
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1984), emphasis 
added. 
Thus, even though defendants attempt an appeal of a 
"mere discovery motion," defendant's claims involve substantial 
issues with broad-based concerns which should be subject to 
interlocutory appeal under the Cohen exception. Cf. United 
States v. Deffenbauah Industries Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 755 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (reviewing a discovery motion on appeal per the 
collateral order exception to the finality rule). 
CONCLUSION 
Interlocutory review of this matter by either appellate 
court based on the collateral order doctrine will prevent the 
unnecessary prolongation of a useless and expensive response to 
overbroad discovery requests and will resolve important issues 
collateral to the merits in this case. 
5 
2A RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /' day of October, 1993 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
*^yUuk*-
ELIZABETH KING 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DEPOSITION, this 1f^1 day of October, 1993, to the following: 
Elizabeth T. Dunning 
Mary J. Woodhead 
WATKISS, DUNNING & WATKISS 
111 East Broadway, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
cl^n^^h 
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EXHIBIT A 
r..v.. 
ELIZABETH T. DUNNING (3896) 
MARY J. WOODHEAD (5581) 
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS 
Broadway Centre, Suite 800 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
Telephone: (801) 530-1500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JUL t 6 1993 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAN L. TYLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, NORMAN G. ANGUS, 
and CHARLES F. LARSEN, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 920901254CV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on March 23,1993 on the Motion 
of plaintiff Jan L. Tyler ('Tyler") to Compel responses to Plaintiffs Second Request for 
Production of Documents and Tyler's Motion to Amend. Tyler was represented by Elizabeth 
T. Dunning and Mary J. Woodhead. Defendants Department of Human Services, Norman 
G. Angus and Charles F. Larsen were represented by John P. Soltis, Barbara H. Ochoa and 
Carol L. C. Verdoia. 
At the outset of the hearing counsel for defendants stipulated to permit Tyler's filing 
her Amended Complaint which adds Tylerfs breach of contract claim. 
Having reviewed the memoranda of the parties in support of and in opposition to 
Tyler's Motion to Compel, having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised 
in this matter, the Court finds that with rare exception, discovery in litigated matters is 
governed by the rules of discovery and evidence and not by the provisions of the 
Government Records Access and Management Act. The Court further finds that no parts 
of the requested discovery are subject to any exclusionary rule or privilege at this point in 
the proceedings. Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
That Tyler's Motion to Compel responses to Tyler's Second Request for Production 
of Documents is GRANTED/ 
DATED this / /» day of 
EXHIBIT B 
JAN GRAHAM (1321) 
Attorney General 
ELIZABETH KING (4863) 
Assistant Attorney General 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAN L. TYLER, : 
Plaintiff and : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Appellee, 
: Subject to Assignment to the 
v. Court of Appeals 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
SERVICES, NORMAN G. : Civil No. 
ANGUS, and CHARLES F. 
LARSEN, : 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Defendants/Appellants, the State of Utah, Utah 
Department of Human Services, Norman G. Angus and Charles F. 
Larsen, submit the following docketing statement pursuant to Rule 
9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1. Date of Entry of Judgment or Order Appealed From: 
July 16, 1993. 
2. Nature of Post Judgment Motion (s) and Date(s) 
Filed: Defendants' Memoranda in Support of Defendants' Motion 
for Clarification and Reconsideration dated June 22, 1993, and 
July 13, 1993. 
3. Date and Effect of Order(s) Disposing of Post 
Judgment Motion(s) and Order of Determination of Final Judgment 
Under Utah R. Civ, P. 54(b): Order Denying Defendants' Motion 
for Clarification and Reconsideration dated July 16, 1993, and 
Minute Entry dated July 20, 1993; there is no Order of Final 
Judgment. 
4. Date of Piling of Notice of Appeal: August 13, 
1993. 
5. Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) (1992) and 
the Collateral Order Doctrine. 
6. Name of Trial Court or Agency: Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
presiding. 
7. Statement of Pacts: This action involves a claim 
by plaintiff that she was transferred from her employment with 
the Department of Human Services in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-21-3 (the Whistle Blower Claim); that her transfer violated 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (the Title VII Claim); and includes a breach 
of contract claim. 
In February, 1993, plaintiff brought a motion to 
compel discovery requesting that the trial court hold that the 
Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) does not 
apply to civil discovery. After lengthy briefing, Judge Moffat 
agreed with plaintiff's interpretation of the law and held that 
"discovery in litigated matters is governed by the Rules of 
Discovery and Evidence and not by the provisions of the 
Government Records and Management Act." (Order dated July 16, 
1993.) The Court further found that "no parts of the requested 
discovery are subject to any exclusionary rule or privilege-11 
(Id.) 
8. Issues for Review and Standard of Review: 
A, Whether GRAMA is applicable to civil 
discovery. 
(1). How to reconcile the conflicting 
provisions of GRAMA in cases involving the State as a litigant. 
(2) . If GRAMA does not apply in civil 
discovery, which aspects of the statutory language and of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply to limit discovery in this 
case; i.e., (a) privilege of confidentiality; (b) relevancy 
threshold. 
(3). Whether defendants are entitled to an 
in-camera examination of documents in this case to determine 
whether plaintiff's interest in disclosure outweighs the State's 
interest in confidentiality. 
B. Whether the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's Whistle Blower Claim in 
contradiction of Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3 (1989). 
These are questions of law; therefore, this Court 
must review the decision below for correctness, according it no 
deference. Ledfors v. Emery County School Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 
1162-63 (Utah 1993). 
9. Determination of Case by Supreme Court: This case 
involves questions of first impression regarding the 
interpretation of the Utah Government Records Access and 
3 
Management Act (GRAMA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, ££ seq.. 
specifically the 1992 amendment encoded in § 63-2-207, Utah Code 
Ann. and the Whistle Blower claim encoded in §§ 67-21-1, e£. seq. 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction 
and decide this case. 
10. Determinative Law: 
Statutes: Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, ££ seq.: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-204, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-205; § 63-2-207, § 63-2-201 (5) (a) and (b); §§ 67-21-
1, St. seq.: and Utah Code § 78-24-8. 
Rules: Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Cases: Durfey v. School Board of Education of 
Wayne County School District, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1979); State 
Road Commission v. Petty. 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966); Meyers v. 
Salt Lake City Corp.. 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Madsen 
v. United Television. Inc., 801 P.2d 912 (Utah 1990); and Glasman 
v. Second District Court. 80 Utah 1, 7, 12 P.2d 361, 363 (1932) 
(cited with favor in State v. Perank. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
(1992)) . 
11. Related Appeals: There are no prior or related 
appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jA. day of September, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ELIZABETH KING \ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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